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Workplace Violence: Vicarious Liability and
Negligence Theories as a Two-Fisted Approach to
Employer Liability. Is Louisiana Clinging to an
Outmoded Theory?

I. INTRODUCTION

Horror stories ofworkplace violence saturate American newscasts
and front page headlines. Shooting rampages such as the December
6, 2001, incident in which an Indiana factory worker opened fire at

his workplace, killing one co-worker and injuring several others
before killing himself, focus attention on workplace violence in
America.' In 1999 alone, the Bureau ofLabor Statistics reported 645
workplace homicides in the United States.2 Although these statistics
declined ten percent from 1998 and the statistics were the lowest total
since the Bureau of Labor Statistics initiated its national tally of
work-related fatalities in 1992, the fear of workplace violence
remains. For instance, while shooting rampages dominate the media
coverage, much less consideration is given to the two million workers
who are susceptible to non-fatal violent assaults, attacks, and threats
in the workplace.4 Experts who conduct workplace violence forums
caution that "as the softening economy brings firings and increased
financial pressures, employees need to be alert for potential episodes
Additionally, as anxiety regarding
of workplace violence."'
workplace safety increases, "employers need to rethink how best to
meet their legal obligations to maintain safe workplaces." 6
From a social standpoint, who is at risk from workplace violence?
The answer to this question is both employees and third parties, such
as on-premises customers, consumers, and suppliers. In 2000,
workplace violence was the most significant security concern for
employers because of its financial and emotional impact, which can
devastate their businesses.7 Employers must consider the economic
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

1. Worker, Gunman Die inFactoryRampage, The Shreveport Times, Dec.
7, 2001, at IA.
2. Workplace Violence: RampageShootingsNot GreatestRisks;Most Deaths,
Assaults are Job Specific, Occupational Safety and Health Daily (BNA-OSHD),
Jan. 22, 2001, at d-3.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Maggie Mulvihill, At the Bar: Workplace Violence Can Be Defused,
Boston Herald, July 17, 2001, at 25 (Finance).
6. Workplace Safety, Individual Employment Rights Newsletter, Labor
Relations Reporter (BNA), Nov. 13, 2001, at 92.
7. Workplace Violence: Job-Related Violence is Top Concern of Large
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costs ofworkplace violence, including lost workdays, lost wages, lost
revenue, and litigation costs.' Additionally, employers must also bear
the human costs ofworkplace violence such as diminished employee
morale. 9
From a legal standpoint, however, the pressing issue concerns
who is liable for workplace violence. The most common answer is
employers. Thus, employers are contemplating their potential
liability and, to no surprise, hoping to limit their liability in the
context of workplace violence.
This comment examines the legal liability of an employer for
workplace violence. Employers need to understand the various
theories of legal liability with respect to workplace violence so they
can assess their potential liability and implement measures that aim
to not only limit their potential liability but also prevent and mitigate
incidents of workplace violence, all of which are goals of tort law.
When employers take preventive measures, workplace violence
incidents may be less likely to occur.
Part II analyzes Louisiana employers' potential liability for
workplace violence through two factual scenarios."0 The first
Employers in 2000, Survey Finds, Occupational Safety & Health Daily (BNAOSDH), Apr. 18, 2000, at d-4.
8. Jules M. Davis, Note, Survey ofDevelopments in North CarolinaLaw And
The Fourth Circuit, 1999-PotentialViolence to the Bottom Line-Expanding
Employer Liabilityfor Acts of Workplace Violence in North Carolina,78 N.C. L.
Rev. 2053 (2000).
9. Id. at 2054.
10. There is also a third factual scenario of workplace violence involving a
third party entering the workplace and committing an act of violence against an
employee or multiple employees. For example, in Mundy v. Dep't ofHealth and
Human Res., 620 So. 2d 811 (La. 1993), a licensed practical nurse filed a
negligence action against her employer, Charity Hospital, for injuries received
when she was attacked by an unidentified third party in a Charity Hospital elevator.
The court found that the workers' compensation statute did not bar the negligence
action because there was a relatively weak showing of "course of employment" and
the risk which gave rise to the employee's injury was "neutral." Mundy v. Dep't
of Health and Human Res., 593 So. 2d 346 (La. 1992). Because the dual
requirements ofthe workers' compensation statute were not satisfied, the employer
was denied tort immunity. Id. The employee argued that the hospital was
negligent in failing to provide adequate security and in failing to maintain a safe
working environment. Using the duty-risk analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant was negligent. The court
reasoned that the security measures taken by the hospital were reasonable and that
the hospital could not have anticipated the incident involving the plaintiff. Thus,
the court denied recovery.
Domestic violence that overflows into the workplace is another common
manifestation of the third factual scenario of workplace violence. In Holliday v.
State, 747 So. 2d 755 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999), a husband walked into his wife's
office and shot her six times. The wife died as a result of this incident and her
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scenario involves one or more employees committing intentional acts
of violence against each other. The second scenario involves
intentional acts of violence committed by employees against third
parties. As seen by these two scenarios, dual-theories emerge in the
Louisianajurisprudence as avenues to hold employers responsible for
acts ofworkplace violence: (1) vicarious liability I and (2) negligent
hiring, retaining, training, and supervising. 2 The critical issue is
whether both theories, when applied together, provide an unnecessary
"two-fisted" approach to employer liability in the context of
workplace violence. For instance, in Libersat v. J & K Trucking,
Inc., 13the Louisiana Third Circuit Court ofAppeal held that the trial
court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on both vicarious
liability and theories ofnegligent hiring and training. In the context
of employer liability for workplace violence, the negligence theories
mother filed a wrongful death lawsuit against, among others, the State ofLouisiana,
as her daughter's employer. The plaintiff alleged that "the state was negligent for
...failing to provide adequate security and failing to protect [her daughter] from
the criminal attack despite the knowledge of her supervisors of the impending
nature of the attack." Id. at 757. The court held that the workers' compensation
statute was inapplicable to this case because under La. R.S. 23:103 1(E), "the injury
arose out of a dispute with another person or employee over matters unrelated to
the injured employee's employment. Id. at 758. Thus, the plaintiff was free to
pursue a tort remedy against the State of Louisiana. Id. at 759.
Although the third factual scenario of workplace violence demonstrates the
application ofnegligence theories such as negligent supervision and protection, in
the context ofworkplace violence, the third factual scenario does not exemplify the
tension between vicarious liability and the negligence theories in the context of
workplace violence, the major focus of this comment, because employers rarely
can be held vicariously liable for acts of non-employees. Thus, the third factual
scenario of workplace violence will not be addressed further in this comment.
11. Vicarious liability is the traditional theory employed by plaintiffs to impose
liability upon employers for intentional acts of workplace violence. Employers
may also be held vicariously liable for the negligence of their employees when
third parties are injured. However, because most employee acts of workplace
violence involve intentional torts, the discussion in this comment is limited to
employers' vicarious liability for intentionalacts of workplace violence.
12. These negligence theories are emerging as a form of recovery for plaintiffs
in the context of workplace violence.
13. 772 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2000). In Libersat,the driver of a car
was killed when he rear-ended a truck, driven by the defendant's employee, while
it was stopped to make a U-turn. The car driver's surviving spouse and children,
alleged that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defendant's
duty in hiring and training the truck driver. Further, they argued that the trial court
did not instruct the jury on negligent hiring and training because the court likened
vicarious liability to all possible theories of recovery. The third circuit held that if
the employee did not commit an underlying tort, then the employer could not be
held liable for negligent hiring and training, or presumably the other negligence
theories. The court also noted that the trial judge was within his discretion in
deciding what law was applicable and appropriate in this case.
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provide the more appropriate basis for employer liability. Yet,
Louisiana continues to cling to the outmoded theory of vicarious
liability.
Part III discusses the theory ofvicarious liability with respect to
workplace violence. Part IV examines the theories of negligent
hiring, retaining, training, and supervising in the context ofworkplace
violence. Part V addresses ways in which employers can limit their
potential liability and exposure to losses, including employment plans
and employment practices liability insurance. Part V then explores
what effect the emerging negligence theories have or should have on
the application of the traditional vicarious liability theory in the
context of workplace violence, suggesting that the much used
vicarious liability theory should be restricted in the context of
workplace violence while the negligence theories should provide the
main avenue of recovery for plaintiffs. Part V finally analyzes the
relationship between employer immunity for disclosing past
employment information under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291
and the Louisiana Workers' Compensation statute's exclusivity
provision with respect to workplace violence.
II. FACTUAL SCENARIOS OF WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
Two factual scenarios exemplify Louisiana employers' potential
liability for workplace violence: where one or more employees
commit an intentional act ofviolence against each other ("employeeemployee workplace violence") and where an employee commits an
intentional act ofviolence against a third party ("employee-third party
workplace violence"). Quebedeaux v. Dow Chemical Company 4
illustrates a scenario of employee-employee workplace violence.
There, an employee brought an action against his former co-employee
and Dow, his former employer, for injuries sustained when his coemployee committed a battery upon him at work. Both employees
were subsequently terminated for fighting, under Dow's "zero
tolerance" policy.' 5 The court held that Dow was responsible for the
co-employee's intentional tort under Louisiana Civil Code article
2320 because the conduct was so closely connected in time, place,
and causation to employment duties that it constituted a risk of harm
attributable to the employer's business. Dow was assessed damages
associated with the physical injuries that arose from the battery and
the plaintiff's termination. The plaintiff did not allege any negligence
by Dow, such as negligent hiring, retaining, training, and supervising,
because under Louisiana law, all negligence claims "arising out of
14. No. 2000-0465, 2001 WL 498959 (La. App. 1st Cir. May 11, 2001).
15. Id.
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are barred by
employment" and "in the course of his employment"
6 This limitation of
statute.'
the Louisiana Workers' Compensation
workers' compensation law distinguishes employee-employee
party workplace violence.
workplace violence from employee-third
7 illustrates a scenario ofemployeeGriffin v. KmartCorporation
third party workplace violence. In Griffin, Kmart was held
vicariously liable for the acts of its employee under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2320 and for negligent training under Article 2315. A
sporting goods employee fired an air pistol twice at two customers
who had asked the employee for a price check. " The court found that
because the employee was within the course and scope of his
employment, Kmart was liable for one hundred percent of the
damages under vicarious liability because the employee was one
hundred percent at fault. Further, the court held that Kmart was
negligent in failing to provide weapons handling training to the
employee because the employee's criminal behavior was within the9
scope of the duty imposed on Kmart to provide such training.
Hence, Kmart was liable to the plaintiffs for damages under both
vicarious liability and a negligent training theory.
III. THE TRADITIONAL THEORY OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In common-law jurisdictions, respondeat superior denotes an
employer's liability for its employee's wrong performed during the
course and scope ofemployment." Louisiana Civil Code article 2320
codifies this concept and states:
Masters and employers are answerable for the damage
occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of
the functions in which they are employed ....
In the above cases, responsibility only attaches, when the
masters or employers.., might have prevented the act which
caused the damage, and have not done it.
The master is answerable for the offenses and quasi-offenses
committed by his servants, according to the rules which are
explained under the title: Ofquasi-contracts,and ofoffenses
and quasi-offenses.
Thus, an employer is vicariously liable for the torts its employee
commits in the course and scope of employment. Course and scope
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
at 308

La. R.S. 23:1031-1032 (1998).
776 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2000).
Id.at 1229.
Idat 1231.
Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law §13-2,
(1996).
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"refers not only to the conduct of the servant [employee] occurring
while employed on the premises, or during the time of employment,
but also to the furtherance of the purposes of his employment." 21 In
fact, under Louisiana law, there is a presumption in favor of finding
course and scope.22
In the context ofworkplace violence, the key issue is whether the
employer is vicariously liable for the intentionaltorts or acts of its
employees. This is critical for employers because vicarious liability
is solidary, despite Louisiana's comparative fault regime under
Louisiana Civil Code articles 232323 and 2324(B). 24 Because of
solidarity, in a claim of vicarious liability, an employer is liable for
all all ofthe fault assigned to its employee. In both Quebedeaux and
Griffin, the courts held that the employers were liable for their
employees' intentional acts of workplace violence because the
employees were acting within the "course and scope ofemployment"
at the time the acts were committed.
The Louisiana jurisprudence has established certain criteria for
determining whether an employee is in the course and scope of his
employment at the time he commits an intentional act of violence.

21. William E. Crawford, Tort Law § 9.11, at 145, in 12 Louisiana Civil Law
Treatise (2000).
22. Id. For an illustration of the presumption of course and scope of
employment, see Windham v. Security Ins. Co., 337 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1976), rehearingdenied, applicationdenied,341 So. 2d 407 (La. 1977).
23. La. Civ. Code art. 2323(A) states:
In any action for damages where a person suffers injury, death, or loss,
the degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or contributing to
the injury, death, or loss shall be determined, regardless of whether the
person is a party to the action or a nonparty, and regardless of the person's
insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by statute, including but not limited
to the provisions ofR.S. 23:1032, or that the other person's identity is not
known or reasonably ascertainable. If a person suffers injury, death, or
loss as the result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result ofthe
fault of another person or persons, the amount of damages recoverable
shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage ofnegligence
attributable to the person suffering the injury, death, or loss.
24. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B) reads:
If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, then liability for
damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint and divisible
obligation. A joint tortfeasor shall not be liable for more than his degree
of fault and shall not be solidarily liable with any other person for
damages attributable to the fault of such other person, including the
person suffering injury, death, or loss, regardless of such other person's
insolvency, ability to pay, degree of fault, immunity by statute or
otherwise, including but not limited to immunity as provided in R.S.
23:1032, or that the other person's identity is not known or reasonably
ascertainable.
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LeBrane v. Lewis25 is the leading case involving an employer's
vicarious liability for the intentional torts of its employees. There,
the issue was whether "the supervisor was acting within the course
and scope of his employment" at the time the intentional tort was
committed against a co-employee. 26 The supervisor terminated
plaintiff s employment. When the manager who normally issued the
termination pay was not in the office, the supervisor and plaintiffrode
down the elevator together. A heated argument ensued, and the two
men began to fight. Although it is unclear who was the initial
aggressor, the fight ended with the supervisor stabbing the employee
as the employee tried to run away. The court found that the factors
to determine whether the supervisor was acting within the course and
scope of his employment at the time the intentional act was
committed were (1) whether the tortious act was primarily
employment rooted; (2) whether the violence was reasonably
incidental to the performance of the employee's duties; (3) whether
and (4) whether it
the act occurred on the employer's premises;
27 The court held the
occurred during the hours of employment.
employer vicariously liable because the "dispute which erupted into
violence was primarily employment-rooted, the fight was reasonably
incidental to the performance ofthe supervisor's duties in connection
with firing the recalcitrant employee and causing him to leave the
place of employment, [and] it occurred on the employment premises
...during the hours ofemployment. 28 Since the LeBrane decision,
courts "have required some connection between the intentional harm
and the employment" in order to impose liability upon the
employer.29
3
In Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hospital," the employer was
found to be vicariously liable when its employee raped a psychiatric
patient in the employer's hospital. The court applied the LeBrane
factors to make the determination, noting that it was not necessary for
all of the LeBrane factors to be met in order to impose liability upon
the employer because each individual case had32to be decided on its
own facts and merits. 3 ' Citing Turnerv. State, the court stated,
25.

292 So. 2d 216 (La. 1974).

26. Id. at 218.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Crawford, supranote 21, § 23.6 at 436; see also Miller v. Keating, 349 So.
2d 265 (La. 1977).
30. 594 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
31. Id. at 573.
32. 494 So. 2d 1292 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986). In Turner,four young women
wished to join the Louisiana National Guard (LNG). After convincing the women
that he had the authority to conduct a physical examination, a LNG recruiting
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If the tortious conduct of the employee is so closely
connected in time, place and causation to his employment
duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly attributable to
the employer's business, as compared with conduct motivated
by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to the
employer's interests, it can then be regarded as within the
scope of the employer's employment, so that the employer is
liable in tort to third persons injured thereby.31
The court also distinguished between liability in negligence cases and
cases involving vicarious liability, stating that "vicarious liability is
imposed upon the employer without regard to his own negligence or
fault; it is a consequence of the employment relationship."34 Thus,
vicarious liability is a type of strict liability imposed upon the
employer. Here, the intentional act of violence occurred on the
employer's premises while the employee was on duty, satisfying two
of the LeBrane factors. Discussing other elements of the LeBrane
test, the court stated,
[T]he tortious conduct committed by Stewart [the employee]
was reasonably incidental 'to the performance ofhis duties as
a nurse's assistant although totally unauthorized by the
employer and motivated by the employee's personal interest.
Further, Stewart's actions were closely connected to his
employment duties so that the risk of harm faced by the
young female victim was fairly attributable to his employer,
who placed the employee in his capacity as a nurse's assistant
and in a position of authority and contact with the victim.3"
More recently, inBaumeisterv. Plunkett,36 the Louisiana Supreme
Court applied the LeBrane factors to a case dealing with the sexual
battery of a clinical technician by a nursing supervisor while both
employees were on duty. The court held that the employer was not
vicariously liable for its employee's sexual battery. In examining the
meaning of the "course and scope of employment" under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2320, the court stated that "course" pertains to time
officer committed sexual batteries against the women. The women sued the officer
and the state of Louisiana as his employer. The court held that the recruiting
officer was an employee of the state and, that under the LeBrane factors, the
recruiting officer was in the course and scope of his employment when he
committed the sexual batteries against the women.
33. Samuels, 594 So. 2d at 574; accordLeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216,218
(La. 1974).
34. Samuels, 594 So. 2d at 574 (citations omitted).
35. Id.
36. 673 So. 2d 994 (La. 1996).

2002]

COMMENT

905

and place while "scope" explores the employment-related risk of
injury. 37 The court found that employers were not vicariously liable
tort
simply because their employees had perpetrated an intentional
38
during their working hours and on business grounds. Rather, an
employer's "[v]icarious liability will attach in such a case only if the
duties and also in
employee is acting within the ambit ofhis3 assigned
9
furtherance of his employer's objective." The court cited LeBrane
to determine ifthe employer was vicariously liable for the intentional
acts of its employee and held that the last two LeBrane factors
(premises and hours) were established in this case. However, the first
two LeBrane factors did not exist. The court stated that it was not a
risk attributable to the performance of the supervisor's duties for a
nursing supervisor to find an employee alone in the nurses' lounge
and sexually assault her.' Further, the court reasoned that Plunkett's
tortious act was not primarily employment rooted because "the
purpose of serving the master's business" did not "actuate[] the
servant to any appreciable extent."'" Under the facts ofBaumeister,
the employee's sexual assault was completely immaterial to his
employer's interests.42
Both LeBrane and Baumeister involve incidents of employeeemployee workplace violence-one or more employees committing
intentional acts of violence against each other-while Samuels
involves employee-third party workplace violence-intentional acts
of violence committed by employees against third parties. In
LeBrane andSamuels, the court imposed liability upon the employers
under a vicarious liability theory. However, in Baumeister, the court
imposed no liability upon the employer. In these cases, the decision
to impose liability upon the employer for its employee's intentional
acts of workplace violence was directly tied to how narrowly or
broadly the courts interpreted the LeBrane factors and the term
"course and scope of employment," focusing mainly on the "scope"
analysis43 when "course" was clearly satisfied. Additionally, the

37. Id. at 996 (citations omitted).

38. Id.at 997 (citations omitted); accordScott v.Commercial Union Ins. Co.,

415 So. 2d 327, 329 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Bradley v. Humble Oil & Refining
Co., 163 So. 2d 180 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
39. Baumeister,673 So. 2d at 996 (citation omitted).

40. Id. at 999.
41. Id. (emphasis omitted).
42. Id. at 1000.

43. The "scope" analysis examines how far courts are willing to go in
determining whether an injury is related to employment. This analysis is usually
performed through the first two LeBranefactors, analyzing whether the intentional
act was primarily employment rooted and whether the violent act was reasonably
incidental to the performance of the employee's duties.
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courts tended "to find the employer liable, if at all rational, because
he is more likely to be solvent than is the employee.""
The judiciary has varied greatly in its analysis ofthe term "course
and scope of employment" in the context of intentional torts.45 For
instance, the Samuels court "was extremely broad in finding
employment rooted conduct" in the context ofa sexual assault.46 The
court broadly construed the term "course and scope ofemployment,"
apparently relying heavily upon the Louisiana presumption in favor
of finding course and scope. However, in Baumeister,the Louisiana
Supreme Court narrowed its interpretation and "came out with amore
restrictive analysis" of the LeBrane factors, stating that "a sexual
assault by a supervisor in a hospital ... [is] not ... reasonably
'
incidental to the performance of his [employment] duties."47
Recently, two Louisiana courts had the opportunity to apply the
amorphous LeBrane factors in Quebedeaux v. Dow Chemical
49 In Quebedeaux,
Company48 and Griffin v. Kmart Corporation.
the
court found that the battery was committed within the course and
scope of employment because the intentional tort occurred on the
employment premises and during working hours.50 Additionally, the
dispute began over employment-related issues because the coemployee did not believe that the plaintiff executed his job efficiently
and felt that the plaintiff took issue with taking orders from him."
Because the fight and the argument between the two men were
employment rooted, Dow was held vicariously liable for the battery
of the co-employee.
In Griffin, whether the tort was committed during the "course of
employment" was answered easily because the employee "was on
duty working at the store in his assigned job when he assaulted the
plaintiffs."52 The real issue, however, was whether the employee was
within the "scope of employment" at the time he assaulted the
plaintiffs. The court stated that "[t]he fact that Kmart presumably
would not have condoned [the employee's] firing the air pistol at
plaintiffs did not remove that act from the scope of his
employment."53 Thus, the employee's conduct was "connected
closely enough to his employment to make it fair that the loss be
44. Crawford, supranote 21, § 9.11, at 146.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 23.6, at 436.
47. Id.
48. Quebedeaux V.Dow Chem. Co., No. 2000-0465, 2001 WL 498959, at *4
(La. App. 1st Cir. May 11, 2001).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Griffin v. Kmart Corp., 776 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2000).
Quebedeaux, No. 2000-0465, 2001 WL 498959, at *4.
Id.
Griffin, 776 So. 2d 1226, 1232 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Id.
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borne by the enterprise," and Kmart was found vicariously liable for
the employee's assault.54
The interesting issue in Griffin is whether it was sensible for the
court to also impose liability under a negligence theory. A
negligence claim appears superfluous when the employee was in the
course and scope of employment and Kmart was already liable for the
totality of the damages under a vicarious liability theory. While
Libersatv. J& K Trucking,Inc." recognized the overlapping theories
of vicarious liability and negligent hiring, retaining, training, and
supervising, Griffin is the perfect illustration ofhow Louisiana courts
fail to acknowledge the overlap ofthe two theories, both ofwhich are
56
intertwined with an underlying tort of the employee.
IV. THE EMERGING THEORIES OF NEGLIGENT HIRING, RETAINING,
TRAINING, AND SUPERVISING

While employers may have a valid defense against vicarious
liability if the intentional act of their employee was not within the
course and scope of his employment," they "still may face liability
if [they] were negligent in the hiring," retaining, training, or
supervising of their employees.58 However, as Libersat explained,
the employee must have first committed an underlying tort before an
employer can be held liable for negligent hiring and supervising, and
presumably the other negligence theories. 59
The negligence theories are based on Louisiana Civil Code article
2315, which states, "Every act whatever ofman that causes damage
6
to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." The
negligence theories are analyzed as ordinary negligence suits and are
to be reviewed using a duty-risk analysis. 6' Additionally, courts
commonly refer to negligent hiring, retaining, training, and
54. Id.
55. 772 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2000).
56. The overlap and tension between vicarious liability and the negligence
theories with respect to workplace violence is addressed infrain the proposals and
recommendations section of this comment.

57. Crawford, supra note 23, § 9.11, at 147.

58. Id.

59. The Libersatcourt reasoned that "if [the employee] did not breach a duty
to the Appellants then no degree of negligence on the part of [the employer] in
hiring [the employee] would make [the employer] liable to the Appellants." 772
So. 2d at 179. Essentially, the court held that the employer was not negligent in
hiring a bad driver if that bad driver was not negligent in causing the accident and
injury.
60. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.
61. Smith v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 540 So. 2d 363 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1989).
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supervising as one tort.62 Yet, it would be more prudent for courts to
classify the negligence theories into separate and distinct causes of
action.'3
Griffin v. Kmart Corporation' is the first Louisiana case where
a court used a theory ofnegligent training to impose liability upon the
employer for its employee's intentional act ofworkplace violence.65
The court found that Kmart had a duty to exercise care in hiring and
training an employee whosejob included handling and working with
guns.6 Citing Lou-Con, Inc. v. Gulf Building Services, Inc.,67 the
court stated, "When an employer hires an employee who in the
performance of his duties will have a unique opportunity to commit
a tort against a third party, he has a duty to exercise reasonable care
in the selection of that employee.16 The court held that:
Kmart failed to provide training to [the employee] in handling
the weapons he was responsible for selling and inappropriate
behavior with customers regarding guns. Such failure was a
breach of Kmart's duty. Providing an employee with access
to guns provides that employee with a "unique opportunity"
to cause injury to customers, regardless whether the
employee's action is done negligently or with intent. The fact
62. See Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991).
63. Usually, courts distinguish the separate negligence theories in their
discussion and analysis, even it is done inadvertently.
64. 776 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 5th Cir.2000).
65. The trial court in Griffln held that Kmart was negligent in the hiring,
training, or supervising of the employee. 776 So. 2d at 1231. The appellate court
found no clear error in this ruling but focused its decision on the theory of
negligent training. Id. However, the appellate court cited cases that concentrated
on negligent hiring, illustrating the common occurrence of how courts treat
negligent hiring, retaining, training, and supervision as one tort.
66. Id. at 1232.
67. 287 So. 2d 192, 199 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ denied,290 So. 2d 899
(La. 1974). In Lou-Con, the plaintiff, a client of ajanitorial service company, filed
suit against the company for damages to his building that one of the janitorial
service company's employees burned down. The plaintiff alleged theories of
vicarious liability and negligent hiring and supervising. The court held that the
company was not vicariously liable for its employee's intentional act of arson
because the employee broke into the client's building after hours to perpetrate a
theft and then set the building on fire to hide the theft. Thus, the employee was not
within the course and scope of his employment at the time ofthe arson. Further,
the court held that the employer was not negligent in hiring or supervising the
employee because the company exercised reasonable care in the selection of the
employee, including a background check with the New Orleans Police Department.
The court also reasoned that the company was not negligent in supervising the
employee because it was not foreseeable that an employee with a set ofkeys to a
building would break in his workplace and commit the crime of arson.
68. Griffin, 776 So. 2d at 1231.
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that [the employee] had access to guns was a cause-in-fact of
the harm to plaintiffs.69
Because the court held that Kmart was negligent in training its
employee, the court did not address negligent hiring. There were
facts that might have warranted such a conclusion, including
admissions by the Kmart human resources manager that there were
concerns because the employee had been terminated by Wal-Mart at
Christmas and the employee's file lacked either a reference check or
a pre-employment questionnaire, either of which would have
provided a suitability rating on the employee who assaulted the
plaintiffs.
In hopes of increasing their chances of successfully imposing
liability upon employers for an employee's intentional act of
workplace violence, victims have begun to employ negligence
theories. The negligence theories are most often used when the
incidents of workplace violence involve employees and third parties
because workers' compensation bars most negligence claims arising
from employee-employee workplace violence. From a legal and a
social standpoint, it is important for courts and practitioners to
explore what effect the negligence theories have on the application of
the traditional theory ofvicarious liability in the context ofworkplace
violence. The use of vicarious liability should be contracted in the
context of workplace violence because victims are likely to recover
under one of the negligence theories, which are more consistent with
Louisiana's fault principles and its pure comparative fault regime.70
Two seminal Louisiana cases recognize the torts of negligent
hiring, retaining, training, and supervising: Smith v. Orkin
ExterminatingCompany,Inc."' andRoberts v. Benoit." In Smith, the
issue was whether Orkin was negligent in retaining an employee who
raped Smith, one of Orkin's customers, because Orkin failed to
properly administer yearly polygraph examinations.73 The court
stated that Orkin breached the duty it had to exercise reasonable care
in the hiring and retention of employees who they sent into a
customer's home.74 Further, the court noted that Orkin had "a unique
business that as a matter of course sends employees into the homes
of its customers to perform services for which it charges and earns a

69. Id.

70. A further discussion of this topic is found infra in the proposals and
recommendations section of this comment.
71.
72.
73.
74.

540 So. 2d 363 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991).
540 So. 2d at 365-67.
Id. at 367.
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profit."75 Thus, as compared to a regular business,76 Orkin was held
to a heightened standard ofduty to protect against the intentional torts
of its employees." Relying on this reasoning, the court held that
Orkin was liable under a theory of negligent hiring.
7 the Louisiana
In Roberts v. Benoit,"
Supreme Court expressly
acknowledged the tort of negligent hiring under the fault principles
embedded in Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. 7 9 The court stated
that even though the employer had a duty to exercise care in hiring,
commissioning, and training the employee in question, this was only
the first step of applying the duty-risk analysis.8 0 The court reasoned
that the plaintiff's injury was outside the contemplation of the
employer's duty." Thus, the court did not impose liability upon the
employer under a negligent hiring, commissioning, and training
theory.
In Harringtonv. The LouisianaState Board ofElementary and
Secondary Education,2 the tort of negligent hiring was explored in
75. Id. at 368.
76. By using the term "regular business," the court is referring to a business
that does not send its employees into the homes of its customers.
77. 540 So. 2d at 368.
78. 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991). In Roberts, defendant was hired by Sheriff
Foti as a cook. Later, the sheriff commissioned all kitchen workers as deputy
sheriffs so that they could qualify for state supplemental pay. The kitchen workers
were given intermittent training, which included one eight hour day of firearm
training, before their commission. During their training, the trainees were
encouraged to carry their weapons while off duty. However, the trainees were also
instructed not to use their weapons unless one's life was in danger or the use of
deadly force was expected. At the time of the accident, defendant was not on duty,
was in his plain clothes, and had been drinking. Defendant was at the plaintiffs
house so that the plaintiff could repair a broken light in his car. While at the
plaintiff's house, defendant removed his revolver and began playing with it. Then,
the revolver discharged and severely injured the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that
SheriffFoti was directly liable for negligently hiring, commissioning, and training
Benoit. Further, plaintiff argued that Sheriff Foti was vicariously liable for the
tortious conduct of his employee. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that Sheriff
Foti was not liable under either theory. The court stated that Benoit was not
performing any function for which he was employed. Thus, the sheriff was not
vicariously liable under La. Civ. Code art. 2320. Additionally, as stated above in
the text, the court held that Sheriff Foti was not liable under any negligence theory
because the plaintiffs injury was not within the scope of the sheriffs duty.
79. Id. at 1044.
80. Id. The Louisiana duty-risk analysis is equivalent to the proximate cause
analysis in other jurisdictions.
81. Id. at 1045.
82. 714 So. 2d 845 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998). In Harrington,the court also
addressed the employer's vicarious liability for Veller's rape ofHarrington. Citing
the LeBranefactors, the court held that Veller was in the course and scope of his
employment because Veller was acting within his position as Director of the
Culinary Arts Apprenticeship Program and a Delgado instructor when he asked
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the context of an "extended workplace" setting. Harrington was a
student at the Culinary Apprenticeship Program at Delgado
Community College. As part of the program, she had an
apprenticeship in a hotel or restaurant and had to meet with chefs and
owners, often during the evening. During one of these nighttime
occasions, Veller, the director of the Culinary Apprenticeship
Program ofLouisiana, raped Harrington. Thus, the rape occurred in
an "extended work environment." Harrington alleged that the state
was negligent for its failure to investigate Veller's criminal3
background, which included felony convictions, before hiring him.
Citing Smith v. Orkin ExterminatingCompany, Inc., the court stated
that "[w]hen an employer hires an employee who will have a unique
opportunity to commit a crime against a third party in the
performance of his duties, the employer has a duty to exercise
reasonable care in the selection of that employee."" Citing Roberts
v. Benoit, the court further stated that:
[I]n determining the exact risks anticipated by the imposition
ofthe duty to use care in employing others, other courts have
generally confined this duty to cases where there is a
connection between the employment and the plaintiff, that is,
where the plaintiff met the employee as a result of the
employment and the employer would receive some benefit
from the meeting had the wrongful act not occurred. 5
Veller admitted that while he had a criminal record when he accepted
the position at Delgado, he did not disclose that fact to any of his
superiors. 6 Further, Delgado made no verbal inquiry nor requested
on its job application as to Veller's criminal record. 7 Officials at
Delgado indicated that they routinely checked a prospective
instructor's credentials but did not routinely conduct an investigation
into a person's background."8 The court reasoned that:
Delgado had a duty to use reasonable care when hiring a
person placed in a position of authority as a professor.
students to events such as wine tastings; part of his job included introducing
students to owners and chefs to encourage apprenticeships and job positions.
Further, the court noted that Harrington was reasonable in believing that the whole
evening was school-related. Thus, the court held that the state was vicariously
liable for Veller's actions because the instructor-student relationship was in effect
at the time of the rape.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 850.
.85. Harrington,714 So. 2d at 850.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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Delgado breached its duty by hiring Veller, a convicted felon
who had served time in prison. The risk of being raped or
harmed by a professor in a position of authority can be
associated with the duty to use reasonable care when hiring. 89
Thus, the State was independently negligent for hiring Veller and
liable to Harrington for damages under a theory of negligent hiring.
When examining an employer's potential liability surrounding
intentional acts of workplace violence, the theories of vicarious
liability and negligent hiring, retaining, training, and supervising are
clearly associated. From a policy standpoint, courts should consider
what effect the emerging negligence theories have on an employer's
vicarious liability for intentional acts of workplace violence,
weighing how broad employer vicarious liability for workplace
violence should be with the negligence theories in place.
V. PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Employment Plans
Workplace violence has been called "a lawsuit waiting to
happen.' Many are likely to question why employers do not plan
ahead and establish their own internal, preventive employment plans
before workplace violence occurs. Employment plans are a rational
measure for employers to implement in order to attempt to prevent
workplace violence. They demonstrate an employer's concern about
workplace violence and its commitment to address problems that
occur.9' Explaining to employees and determining what behavior will
amount to workplace violence is critical to the success of an
employment plan,92 with the adoption of a written, formal definition
of workplace violence being even better. Behavior that constitutes
workplace violence should not only include the more traditional types
of workplace violence-assaults, batteries, and fighting-but also
general workplace harassment and "bullying," both of which can
escalate into full blown workplace violence. 93 Additionally,
employers should create employment plans that emphasize hiring the
best job applicant, warning employees of any direct threats of
89. Id. at 851.
90. Workplace Violence: Professor Warns Employers to Plan Ahead for
Dealingwith Workplace Violence, Threats, Occupational Safety & Health Daily

(BNA-OSHD), Apr. 27, 1998, at d-4.
91.

Id.

92. Id.
93. For a discussion of "workplace bullying," see David C. Yamada, The
Phenomenonof "Workplace Bullying" andthe NeedforStatus-BlindHostile Work
EnvironmentProtection, 88 Geo. L.J. 475 (2000).
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violence, providinj physical security, conducting surveillance, and
providing training.
An employer may be "found negligent in the management of its
premises and working conditions by failing to maintain workplace
security, failing to have emergency action plans, including training
employees about alarms, evacuation, and places ofrefuge, and failing
to have security devices and training for employees who interact with
customers and third parties. ' " 5 Thus, an ideal employment plan could
potentially lessen an employer's liability should its employee
perpetrate a violent act in the workplace. Negligence liability would
be less likely because the development and implementation of an
employment plan may equal reasonable care. However, an
employment plan may not help to prevent vicarious liability because
vicarious liability is a form of strict liability. Still, with a wellbalanced employment plan in place, courts may be more inclined to
use discretion when they impose employer liability, reasoning that
the employee's intentional act of violence was not within the course
and scope of employment. For instance, courts may reason that the
intentional act ofviolence was not "primarily employment rooted" or
"reasonably incidental to the performance of the employee's duties"
because the employer's written, formal employment plan detailed the
range of the employee's employment duties and the employer's
definition ofworkplace violence. Employers will continue to contend
that the intentional torts of their employees are not authorized;
however, with employment plans that define what conduct constitutes
workplace violence and the scope of an employee's employment
duties, employers' standard argument may become more persuasive
to the court. Yet because it is a form of strict liability, employer
vicarious liability will likely remain unaffected by employment plans.
Employment plans may also have drawbacks. An example is the
backfire of "zero tolerance" plans as illustrated by Quebedeaux v.
Dow Chemical Company." There, both employees involved in the
dispute were terminated in accordance with Dow's policy of no
fighting in the workplace. The plaintiff filed suit against Dow,
claiming damages for mental anguish, past and future lost wages, and
future lost benefits that resulted from his termination. The court
stated that under respondeat superior liability, Dow was "liable for all
97
consequences" of its employee's intentional act of violence,
including damages for mental anguish, past lost wages, future lost
wages, and future lost benefits as a result of the employee's
94. Robert L. Levin, Workplace Violence: NavigatingThrough the Minefield
ofLegalLiability, 11 Lab. Law. 171 (1995).
95. Workplace Safety, supranote 6, at 92.
96. No. 2000-0465, 2001 WL 498959 (La. App. 1st Cir. May 11, 2001).
97. Quebedeaux,2001 WL 498959, at *5.
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termination. The critical issue in Quebedeaux was whether the
employer's "zero tolerance" plan backfired. The purpose ofthe "zero
tolerance" plan was to limit or eliminate Dow's liability. Instead, the
policy triggered more extensive liability for Dow resulting from the
employee's termination.98 Situations like the one in Quebedeauxmay
actually deter employers from implementing "zero tolerance" plans,
which are, in effect, absolute rules that remove employers' discretion
to impose discipline. Consequently, employers must continue to
search for other mechanisms to limit their liability for acts of
workplace violence.
There are also situations When employment plans may not suffice
to limit an employer's potential liability for workplace violence.
Despite an employer's preventive plans, incidents of workplace
violence will vary, and the existing employment plan may not
directly address them. Thus, employers must be more aggressive in
attempting to limit their liability, look beyond internal employment
plans, and seek assistance from both the courts and practitioners.
Employers may be able to accomplish their goal of limiting potential
exposure by investing in employment practices liability insurance
policies, advocating the contraction of the vicarious liability theory
in the context of workplace violence, seeking and disclosing
employees' employment information, and arguing for a narrow
exception to the exclusivity provision of the Louisiana Workers'
Compensation statute.
B. Employment PracticesLiability Insurance

In the early 1990s, a new variety of insurance policy,
Employment Practices Liability Insurance ("EPLI"), emerged in the
labor and employment sector. 99 Having been called "the hottest
selling, most talked about insurance product,"'" EPLI policies are
another mechanism employers can utilize to potentially limit their
liability. At their inception, EPLI policies were "tied to specific
causes ofaction."''° However, current EPLI policies include omnibus
language and "cover wrongful employment practices and wrongful

98. The policy may have also caused other employees to back away from the

physical altercation instead of trying to stop it.
99. David L.Leitner et al., Law and Practice ofInsurance Coverage Litigation
§56.6(a) (2000).

100. Jeffrey P. Klenk, Symposium: Emerging CoverageIssues in Employment
Practices LiabilityInsurance: The IndustryPerspectiveon Recent Developments,

21 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 323 (1999).

101. Leitner, supra note 99, at § 56.6(b).
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that encompass many
employment acts," containing broad provisions
"employment related causes of action."' 2
Initially, EPLI policies were burdened with many exclusions,
including the intentional acts exclusion. 3 Most insurance policies,
similar to the EPLI, contain an intentional acts exclusion because,
based on public policy, insurance companies do not want to subsidize
intentional torts. However, "during the more recent evolution of[EPLI
policies]," many of"these exclusions have begun to disappear" because
the EPLI policies with the intentional acts exclusion were not selling
very well.0 4 Yet, manyjurisdictions "still have a public policy against
insurance for intentional acts," and many courts are tentative to enforce
coverage for intentional act employment claims."0 5
Injurisdictions where intentional acts are excluded from insurance
coverage, employers can only depend on EPLI policies to offset their
economic losses from damages awarded under either negligent hiring,
retaining, training, or supervising. Even though most incidents of
workplace violence involve intentional torts, it would still be prudent
for employers to invest in EPLI policies in hopes of minimizing the
overall economic costs ofworkplace violence, especially in the future
because EPLI coverage is still evolving.
C. ContractingVicariousLiability Theories in the Context of
Workplace Violence
Employers are most concerned with their potential vicarious
liability for intentional acts ofworkplace violence because under this
solidary theory, the employer is liable for all ofthe fault allocated to its
employee. One possible solution for employers is to encourage either
the legislature or the judiciary to contract vicarious liability in the
context of employer liability for an employee's intentional acts of
workplace violence in light ofthe expansion ofnegligence theories in
the same context. Employers should consider either hiring lobbyists to
promote specific legislation on this issue or arguing, ad hoc in certain
cases, for the contraction ofvicarious liability in the courtroom.
1. TheoreticalAnalysis of VicariousLiability
The traditional theory of"vicarious liability may be defined as the
imposition of liability upon one party for a wrong committed by
another party."'' 6 Thus, when vicarious liability is imposed upon the
102. Id.
103. Klenk, supranote 100, at 333.
104. Id.
105. Leitner, supra note 99, at §56.6(c).
106. Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic
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employer, the employer is apparently faultless and bears liability
"only because

of the strict liability doctrine of vicarious liability."'

7

Following an utilitarian approach, vicarious liability for intentional

torts is said to be "efficient"'

8

only when the intentional tort is due

in large part to the employer-employee relationship and the
imposition of vicarious liability upon the employer will not
excessively° lessen the employee's desire to avoid wrongful
behavior."
The corrective justice approach, which is grounded on fairness,
is another justification for the imposition of employer vicarious
liability." 0 This approach is based upon the "deeply rooted sentiment

that business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for

accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its

activities."'' The corrective justice theory, however, is unconvincing

because it is based on a fiction, "constru[ing] .

.

. the doer as a

composite: the employer-acting-through-the employee."'" 2 Finding
this theory to be doctrinaire, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes often
argued that vicarious liability was not logical when the defendant's

action created risks unforeseeable to the employer." 3 This argument
reflects the language of Louisiana Civil Code article 2320, which

states that "responsibility only attaches, when the masters or

employers . . . might have prevented the act which caused the

damage, and have not done it." Article 2320 conveys the idea that
employer vicarious liability was meant to be a form ofnegligence and

Analysis oftheScope ofEmployment Rule andRelated LegalDoctrines, 101 Harv.
L. Rev. 563 (1988).
107. Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer
VicariousLiability, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1739, 1740-41 (1996).
108. Throughout his article, Sykes explores the personal liability of the
employee alone (rule A) versus the vicarious liability of the employer (rule B).
Sykes, supranote 106, at 564. The purpose ofthe comparison between rule A and
rule B is to determine the circumstances under which the different rules are
efficient. Id. Sykes defines efficient as "the circumstances under which each rule
best promotes economic welfare." Id. As Sykes explains, "the concept of
economic welfare that underlies the analysis is... [that] liability rule A ... [is]
said to be 'efficient' relative to liability rule B if rule A is potentially Pareto
superiorto rule B from the perspective of society as a whole." Id. "An economic
situation in which no person can be made better off without making someone else
worse off" is called Pareto optimal or Pareto superior. Black's Law Dictionary
1138 (7th ed. 1999).
109. Sykes, supranote 106, at 588.
110. Schwartz, supranote 107, at 1749.
111. Id.(quoting Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d
Cir. 1968)).
112. Id. at 1752 (quoting Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 187
(1995)).
113. David Rosenburg, The Hidden Holmes (1995).
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not strict liability. However, this interpretation of the article was
discarded by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Weaver v. W.L.
Goulden Logging Company in 1906 where the court found that
Article 2320 created a form of strict liability for employer vicarious
liability." 4 The Weaver court's "judicial interpretation of article
2320" was codified in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3921."1
Conversely, Justice Holmes generally supported the imposition of
reasonably6
employer vicarious liability when the employer knewitsoremployee.
could have foreseen the risks of torts committed by
Perhaps Louisiana courts and the Louisiana legislature should
reevaluate the Weaverdecision and the true language ofArticle 2320,
turning the statute into a negligence standard for employers and
incorporating the negligence theories discussed infra.
The economic justifications for imposition of vicarious liability
7
upon the employer are coupled with a deterrence rationale." An
employee's insolvency or his limited resources drives the economic
analysis of employer vicarious liability."' Thus, many scholars have
suggested that employer vicarious liability is simply a "deep pockets"
practice."' Additionally, vicarious liability arguably is an incentive
for employers to shrewdly select, train, supervise, and discipline
employees. 20 But under vicarious liability, which is a form of strict
liability, shrewd behavior by an employer does not help if an
intentional tort is committed by its employee. Rather, shrewd
behavior only helps to limit an employer's liability when the
employer is able to prevent the intentional tort from happening by
hiring and training "safe" employees. Thus, the negligence theories
may actually be are more effective in deterring workplace violence
than vicarious liability.

114. See, e.g., Weaver v. W.L. Goulden Logging Co., 116 La. 468,40 So. 798
(1906). "For many years the [Louisiana] Supreme Court.. . gave full effect to the
restrictive clause of... article [2320]." Id. at 472, 40 So. at 800. However, the
Weaver court noted that "the restriction on the liability of masters embodied in
ofthe Civil Code has been construed out of the text, for the reason
article 2320 ...
that it practically nullifies the liability of the master for the acts ofhis servants as
imposed by the express terms of the same article." Id. at 473-474, 40 So. at 800.
115. Maraist & Galligan, supranote 20, § 13-2, at 308 n.7. La. R.S. 9:3921
(2000) states, in part: "Notwithstanding any provision in Title III ofCode Book III
of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 to the contrary, every master
or employer is answerable for the damage occasioned by his servant or employee

in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed."
116. Rosenburg, supra note 113.
117. Schwartz, supra note 107, at 1755-64.
118. Id. at 1756.
119. Id.at 1744.

120. Id. at 1758.
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2. ContractingVicarious Liability
Why is such a contraction ofvicarious liability in the context of
workplace violence a logical step? The result under Griffin v. Kmart
Corporation,' where the plaintiffs asserted vicarious liability and
negligence theories against Kmart, demonstrates why vicarious
liability for workplace violence should be contracted. In Kmart both
theories were successful and resulted in a damages award. Kmart was
.liable for one hundred percent of the damages under the vicarious
liability theory because the employee was one hundred percent at
fault. However, under the negligence theory alone, the plaintiffs
would have collected only the employer's virile share, seventy
percent. Thus, the claim of negligent hiring, retaining, training, and
supervising is superfluous ifthe employee is in the course and scope
of his employment at the time the intentional act of workplace
22
violence was committed.1
Contracting vicarious liability in the context of workplace
violence will prevent plaintiffs from having two theories that support
the same recovery of damages, a result that has arguably been
inappropriate and unnecessary. When vicarious liability is imposed
upon the employer, the employer is liable for all of the fault assigned
to its employee, which was one hundred percent in Griffin, despite
Louisiana's pure comparative fault regime under Louisiana Civil
Code articles 2323123 and 2324(B)12 4 and the fault principles
embodied in Article 2315.1
Application of the negligence theories
may result in a lower allocation of fault to the employer; however, the
negligence theories are more consistent with Articles 2323 and
2324(B). The solidarity imposed upon the employer by vicarious
liability is residual solidary liability that is not consistent with
Louisiana's movement to apure comparative fault regime. 26 Further,
the argument to contract vicarious liability is compatible with a main
objective of the 1996 tort reforms-to scale back the theories of
absolute liability andstrict liability in Louisiana tort law.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 is a fault based article. It
embodies the principle that Louisiana is more comfortable with
imposing liability upon one who is primarily at fault, not upon one
who is merely imputed with the fault of another. This "actually at
121. 776 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2000).
122. Maraist &Galligan, supra note 20, § 13-2 (Supp. 2001).
123. See supranote 23 for the text of La. Civ. Code art. 2323(A).
124. See supranote 24 for the text of La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B).
125. La. Civ. Code art. 2315 states, "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
126. Articles 2323 and 2324(B) illustrate Louisiana's conscious shift to an
allocation offault regime.
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fault" notion further strengthens the argument that vicarious liability
should be contracted in the context of workplace violence because,
under Louisiana's current law, the employer, who hopefully has a
comprehensive employment plan in place to prevent workplace
violence, will likely be held vicariously liable because of the
imputation of its employee's fault. Considering Louisiana's pure
comparative fault regime and the fault based principles of Article
2315, limiting vicarious liability, where the employer is not at fault
and in light of the expansion of the negligence theories where it is
alleged that the employer is at fault, is more consistent with the legal
and social policies of Louisiana.
The negligence theories may also be the better method to impose
liability on employers because they create incentives for employers
to take additional precautions against workplace violence while
vicarious liability does not. Employers may look at the negligence
theories as a check-list and implement corresponding, precautionary
procedures in order to avoid workplace violence and potential
liability. With the negligence theories, employers have two chances
to lessen or avoid liability. First, employers can implement
employment plans or other preventative measures to try to impede
workplace violence altogether. Second, if the employers cannot
prevent workplace violence, they will be better able to defend against
the negligence theories in court because they must only show that
they demonstrated reasonable care in the development and
implementation of their action plans. It is not easy for employers to
recognize these incentives with the imposition of vicarious liability
because even if employers take precautions, they are likely to still be
held vicariously liable under the strict liability theory.
The counter-argument to the incentive based reasoning is that
until vicarious liability is contracted, employers know and are
forewarned that vicarious liability and its enormous consequences
may be imposed when their employee commits an act of workplace
violence. To prevent this, employers have only one option-to
ensure that workplace violence does not occur. Some employers are
likely to believe that workplace violence is inevitable and that they
will likely be held vicariously liable; thus, they should not waste time
and try to avoid the unpredictable incidents of workplace violence
with burdensome and costly plans. The response to this counterargument is that society generally favors an employment plan with
maximum incentives. Unlike the "all or nothing" characteristic of
vicarious liability, the negligence theories provide employers with
maximum incentives because employers will have two chances to
avoid or lessen their potential liability.
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3. Achieving the Contractionof VicariousLiability
A broad theory of vicarious liability has no apparent purpose
when it is likely that the same parties can use the negligence theories.
From a policy standpoint, courts should examine the tension between
these two alternate theories. Application ofthe negligence theories
in the context of workplace violence appears to be a new
development in Louisiana tort law. With the emergence of the
negligence theories, there is little or no added social benefit ofhaving
a broad theory of vicarious liability in the context of workplace
violence when victims can be compensated under theories of
negligent hiring, retaining, training, and supervising.
Courts can contract vicarious liability by narrowly construing the
phrase "course and scope ofemployment" ofArticle 2320 and by not
borrowing the liberal construction a similar phrase carries in the
context of workers' compensation.' 27 Courts and practitioners
commonly refer to the requirement for workers' compensation as an
injury "within the course and scope" of employment. 2 ' This
language is "borrowed from discussions of tort cases in which the
vicarious liability of an employer is often said to depend upon
whether an employee tortfeasor was acting 'within the course and
scope' of his employment."' 29 It is not good policy to borrow
concepts from one area of law to be used in another, especially
because tort
law and workers' compensation serve distinct
30
purposes.

The course and scope references found in Article 2320 and the
workers' compensation statute need to be clearly distinguished
because "[i]n most states, and certainly including Louisiana, workers'
compensation statutes and cases will give a very broad interpretation
to the concept ofwork-related injuries.' 3' Thus, the key question is
whether courts have been using the term "course and scope of
employment" as a generic term in both vicarious liability cases and
127. La. R.S. 23:1031(A) (1998) states, "If an employee not otherwise
eliminated from the benefits of this Chapter receives personal injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the amounts, on the conditions, and to the person or persons
hereinafter designated." (emphasis added).

128. 1H. Alston Johnson III, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice §144,
n.1, in 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d ed. 1994).
129. Id. at §144 n.1.
130. Id. See L.J. Earnest Construction v. Cox, 714 So. 2d 150, 151 n.1 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1998) (providing further distinction between the workers'
compensation actual statutory requirement and the shorthand reference to "course
and scope of employment").
131. W. Shelby McKenzie & H. Alton Johnson, III, Insurance Law and Practice
§289, at 654, in 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2000).
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workers' compensation cases. If so, many courts have likely
imported "the liberal construction" accorded to most workers'
compensation statutes into vicarious liability cases."I As a result, the
broad construction might have allowed plaintiffs to recover under
vicarious liability theories in situations where they might not have if
the workers' compensation liberal construction had not been imputed
to vicarious liability cases. This occurrence strengthens the argument
that vicarious liability theories should be contracted in the context of
workplace violence.
Courts should also require "some type of employer-related
catalyst,meaning the act performed... should have some link to an
employment-required duty, in order to hold an employer vicariously
liable""' Further, courts should not impose vicarious liability upon
an employer when its employee's intentional act of violence was
completely extraneous to the employer's interests. 3 4 As discussed
infra, "there is no magical formula to establish vicarious liability for
intentional torts committed by employees."' 35 The closest standard
is the LeBrane factor test, in which not all four factors have to be
136
satisfied in order to impose vicarious liability upon the employer.
Each case is also to be decided on its own merits, which essentially
37
means that there is no consistency in the application of the rules.
Further, the Louisianajurisprudence shows that many courts have
an unwritten policy ofimposing vicarious liability upon the employer
when three ofthe four LeBrane factors are met. Because two ofthe
LeBrane factors are readily established (employment premises and
hours), plaintiffs have only to jrove one additional amorphous
LeBrane factor in order to impose vicarious liability upon the
employer. Thus, the standard for imposing employer vicarious
liability has become too flexible. The other two Lebrane
factors-whether the act was primarily employment rooted and
whether the act was reasonably incidental to the performance of the
132. Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989).
See also Timmons v. Silman, 761 So. 2d 507 (La. 2000) (analyzing a vicarious
liability tort case of "frolic and detour" using workers' compensation secondary
sources in order to determine whether an employee was in the course and scope of

employment when he was involved in a multi-vehicle accident that injured third
parties).
133. Allen v. Payne & Keller Co., 710 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1998) (emphasis in original). See Maraist & Galligan, supra note 22, at § 13-5

(Supp. 2001).
134. Pye v. Insulation Techs., 700 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997). See
Maraist & Galligan, supranote 22, at § 13-5 (Supp. 2001).
135. Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So. 2d 994, 1000 (La. 1996).
136. Turner v. State, 494 So. 2d 1292, 1295 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986) (citing
Miller v. Keating, 349 So. 2d 265 (La. 1977)).
137. Id.
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employee's duties-are especially subjective and indefinite. The
satisfaction of these two elements appears to depend upon the
discretion of the court. Thus, in the context of an employee's
intentional acts of workplace violence, Louisiana courts should
require that all four LeBrane factors be satisfied before imposing
vicarious liability upon the employer. Taking these steps would
contract vicarious liability theories in the context of workplace
violence and would assist employers in their struggle to limit their
liability. Finally, the contraction of vicarious liability would also be
likely to create the appropriate incentives for employers to invest in
safe workplaces.
D. LouisianaRevised Statutes 23:291-Isthere a Duty to Disclose
Employment Information?
A peripheral issue in the context of negligent hiring is the
disclosure of an employee's employment information and record to
38
prospective employers. Again, Griffin v. Kmart Corporation'
demonstrates the importance of this issue. There, Kmart's human
resources manager stated that the employee who committed the
assault on the plaintiffs had "red flags" against him when he was
hired because "he had been terminated from his previous job at WalMart relatively close to Christmas." '39 The human resources manager
admitted that she had only checked with the employee's last
employer, Wal-Mart, and that Wal-Mart had only provided the
employee's start and end dates of employment. 14° Had Wal-Mart
disclosed more about the employee's employment history with WalMart to the Kmart human resources manager, the employee's assault
may have been avoided because Kmart might not have hired the
employee.
To encourage former employers to share employment
information, Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291 "provides protection
from civil liability for torts, such as defamation, to those employers

138. 776 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2000).
139. Id. at 1229-1230.
140. Id.at 1230.
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who disclose employment information."' 41 Section 291 is a "shield
law" for employers who provide employment references. "
The Louisiana statute is different from other shield laws because
it contains immunity from the torts associated with hiring for
employers who reasonably rely on the employment information given
to them by a previous employer. 43 However, section 291 also might
have had the inadvertent consequence of assessing the prospective
employer with an affirmative duty to secure employment

information." As information becomes more readily available due
to the immunity provided to former employers, courts may impose a
greater duty on prospective employers to try to contact former
employers. 45 Further, courts may even rely on section 291 to impose
a duty on former employers to provide employment information to
prospective employers."'
As courts recognize broader duties on the part of employers
regarding hiring, and presumably retention, training, and supervision,
vicarious liability seems less necessary and less justifiable.

Specifically, the imposition of an affirmative duty to obtain and
provide employment information strengthens the argument that
negligence theories, not theories of vicarious liability, should be the
primary mechanism for courts to impose liability upon employers for
acts ofworkplace violence. Many prospective employers excuse the

141. La. R.S. 23:291 (2001) states:
A. Any employer that, upon request by a prospective employer ....
provides accurate information about a current or former employee's job
performance or reasons for separation shall be immune from civil liability
and other consequences of such disclosure provided such employer is not
acting in bad faith. An employer shall be considered... acting in bad
faith only if it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information disclosed was knowingly false and deliberately misleading.
B. Any prospective employer who reasonably relies on information
pertaining to an employee's job performance or reasons for separation,
disclosed by a former employer, shall be immune from civil liability
including liability for negligent hiring, negligent retention, and other
causes of action related to the hiring of said employee, based upon such
reasonable reliance, unless further investigation, including but not limited
to a criminal background check, is required by law.
See generally Jennifer L. Aaron, Comment, The Tug-of-War with Employment
Information:DoesLouisianaRevisedStatutes 23:291 ReallyHelpEmployersStay
Out of the Mud?, 58 La. L. Rev. 1131 (1998).
142. Aaron, supranote 141, at 1133.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. In Keaton v. Summers, No. 99-1192,2000 WL 680337 (E.D. La. May 24,
2000), the court, stated that former employers in Louisiana "do not owe a special
duty to disclose negative information about a former employee to prospective
employers." Id. at *8 (citing Aaron, supranote 141, at 1162-63).
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failure to perform background checks and reference checks because
the only information given by the former employer is often the start
and end dates ofemployment. With section 291 in place, prospective
employers arguably no longer have an excuse not to perform
background checks and reference checks, just as former employers
have no reason to withhold pertinent employment information.
However, unless and until courts recognize an affirmative duty to
obtain and provide accurate employment information, the importance
of section 291, especially in the context of workplace violence and
with respect to the negligence theories, remains unclear.
Those familiar with Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291 may also
argue that it gives nothing to employers that qualified privilege, or
conditional privilege, did not previously provide them. 47
Responding to threats of defamation litigation, many employers
"adopted a 'no comment' policy regarding employment information
4
references."' Louisiana already recognized qualified privilege as an
affirmative defense to defamation;149 yet, section 291 is an express
endorsement from the legislature that provides the same type of

immunity. Section 291 may now give employers more confidence in

seeking and disclosing employment information.

Thus, if an

employer is negligent in hiring an employee who commits an
intentional act ofviolence due to its failure to perform a background
check or a reference check with his former employer or because the
former employer failed to provide pertinent employment information,
the broad theory ofimposing liability should be negligent hiring and

not vicarious liability.

E. Louisiana Workers' Compensation Statute-Should All

Negligence Actions be Barredby the Statute?

Louisiana courts may also be hesitant to contract vicarious
liability in the context of workplace violence because of the
Louisiana Workers' Compensation statute's bar of all negligence
claims.'50 This bar is especially important when discussing incidents
147. Aaron, supra note 141, at 1142-44.
148. Id. at 1131 (citing Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Pierce, Encouraging
Employees to Abandon Their "No Comment" PoliciesRegardingJob References:
A Reform Proposal,53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1381 (1996)).
149. Id.at 1139, 1142-44. A qualified privilege attaches "ifthe communication
is (1) in good faith, and is (2) on a subject in which the person making the
comment has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty to a person having
a corresponding interest or duty." Id. at 1142 (citing Hines v. Arkansas Louisiana
Gas Co., 613 So. 2d 646, 656-57 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993)).
150. La. R.S. 23:1032(A)(1)(a) (1998) states:
Except for intentional acts provided for in Subsection B, the rights and
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involving two or more employees committing intentional acts of
violence against each other as illustrated in Quebedeaux v. Dow
Chemical Company' where an employee was injured in the
workplace by a fellow employee's battery. There, vicarious liability
was the employee's only form ofrecovery because a negligent hiring,
training, or supervising claim was barred by the Louisiana Workers'
Compensation statute."'
Vicarious liability should be contracted in the context of
workplace violence. But in a Quebedeaux situation, vicarious
liability is the only way for a plaintiff to recover. Ifvicarious liability
is contracted, employees may not be able to recover as easily under
the traditional theory of vicarious liability due to the contraction or
under the negligence theories because of the workers' compensation
exclusivity rule. Thus, in situations such as this, vicarious liability
should not be contracted unless the Louisiana Legislature revises or
Louisiana courts interpret the Louisiana Workers' Compensation
statute to allow a narrow exception that does not bar negligent hiring,
retaining, training, and supervising claims in the context ofworkplace
violence.
In Louisiana, intentional torts are outside the scope of workers'
compensation coverage while negligence claims are covered by the
Louisiana Workers' Compensation statute. However, this is not a
Some workers' compensation
universal rule in all jurisdictions.'
statutes do not exclude claims of negligent hiring and supervision
arising from workplace sexual harassment. 54 The Florida Supreme
Court held that the Florida Workers' Compensation statute did not
afford the exclusive remedy for an employee's claims based on sexual
harassment in the workplace. 55 The court reasoned that earlier
pronouncements that workers' compensation was the exclusive
remedy for sexual harassment claims arising from workplace sexual
harassment was based on Florida courts' expansion of the definition
of "accident arising out of ...employment" to embrace a broad
variety of injuries. 56 Later, a federal court in Florida declared that,
"in light ofthe strong public policy against sexual harassment in the
remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on account of
an injury, or compensable sickness or disease for which he is entitled to
compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights,

remedies, and claims for damages ....
151. No. 2000-0465, 2001 WL 498959 (La. App. 1st Cir.May 11, 2001).
152. La. R.S. 23:1032 (1998).
153. Jana H. Carey & Theresa C. Mannion, New Developments in the Law of

Sexual Harassmentfrom Meritorto Harris,Karibianand Steiner, 524 PLI/Lit. 7

(1995).
154. Id. at 57.
155.

Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc, 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989).

156. Id. at 1102-03.
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workplace, this [c]ourt interprets Byrd as holding that the exclusivity
rule ofthe workers' compensation statute does not bar Gomez's [the
employee's] claim of negligent retention and supervision."''
Additionally, otherjurisdictions such as Ohio have held that the State
Workers' Compensation law did not bar a claim of negligent
infliction ofemotional distress based on a sexual harassment claim.15 8
Louisiana has recently extended the reasoning used by other
jurisdictions when dealing with workplace sexual harassment to a
claim arising from job-related stress. In Richardsonv. Home Depot
U.S.A.,
the Louisiana First Circuit of Appeal ruled that the
exclusivity provision of the Louisiana Worker's Compensation
statute "does not bar all negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims against an employer" arising from the employee's job-related
stress.160 The court's reasoning was based on Louisiana Revised
Statute 23:1021 (7)(b), which provides,
Mental injury caused by mental stress. Mental injury or
illness resulting from work-related stress shall not be
considered a personal injury by accident arising out ofand in
the course ofemployment and is not compensable pursuant to
this Chapter, unless the mental injury was the result of a
sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the
employment
and is demonstrated by clear and convincing
16
evidence.'
The plaintiff did not prove that her job-related stress was "sudden,
unexpected, and extraordinary."' 16 Thus, her chronic stress was not
considered to be a personal injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of employment, and her negligent infliction of emotional
distress was not barred.
The first issue to consider is whether incidents of workplace
violence can be analogized to workplace sexual harassment claims or
to a Richardsonjob-related stress claim. The analogy to workplace
157. Gomez v. Metro Dade County, 801 F. Supp. 674, 683 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
158. Crihfield'v. Monsanto Co., 844 F. Supp. 371, 375-77 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
159. No. 2000-0393, 2001 WL 293950 (La. App. Ist Cir. Mar. 28, 2001). In
Richardson,the employee was a bookkeeper and "worked in the vault handling the
financial paperwork for Home Depot's consumer transactions." Id. When the
vault staff was reduced, the employee was required to perform additional
employment tasks. She further alleged that other Home Depot personnel constantly
called her during her vacation and holidays to inquire about vault procedures. The
plaintiff developed health problems, including headaches, elevated blood pressure,
stress, and anxiety. Id. She alleged that her health problems were directly related
to the stress caused by her job at Home Depot.
160. Richardson,2001 WL 293950, at *5.
161. La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(b) (1998).
162. Richardson, 2001 WL 293950, at *3.
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sexual harassment is sound because sexual harassment is a type of
workplace violence between employees. Further, just as there is a
strong public policy to maintain a workplace free from sexual
harassment, there is an even stronger public policy to maintain a
workplace free from other incidents ofworkplace violence, especially
those that involve physical injuries to employees. Yet, the analogy
to a Richardsonclaim is not as easy to make because the Louisiana
Workers' Compensation statute does not cover job-related stress
unless it is "the result of a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary
stress related to the employment and is demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence."" 3Thus, the Louisiana statute specifically
allows such a negligence claim forjob-related stress while it does not
specifically allow for claims of negligent hiring, retaining, training,
and supervising relating to workplace violence.
The next issue to consider is whether Louisiana courts should
interpret the Louisiana Workers' Compensation statute as did the
Florida courts to allow negligent hiring, retaining, training, and
supervising claims in the context of workplace violence or whether
the Louisiana Legislature should consider revising the Louisiana
Workers' Compensation statute so that claims of negligent hiring,
retaining, training, and supervising would not be barred by the statute.
Louisiana could focus on the dual requirement of"arising out of...
employment" and "in the course of... employment" in the Louisiana
Workers' Compensation statute.'1 The first requirement refers to "an
inquiry into the character or origin of the risk, while [the second
requirement] brings into focus the time and place relationship
between the risk and the employment."' 65 In order to circumvent the
Louisiana Workers' Compensation statute, practitioners should begin
to assert the theory that acts ofworkplace violence do not occur in the
normal "course of employment," or alternatively, that claims of
negligent hiring, retaining, training, and supervising do not truly
"arise out of employment."
VI. CONCLUSION

Workplace violence affects everyone. We all watch the nightly

newscasts that broadcast workplace violence. We may know a
perpetrator. We could be a victim. We could simply be the consumer
who will bear part of the employer's economic costs of dealing with
workplace violence. The issue of employer liability for acts of
workplace violence is important because of its effects on employees
163.
164.
165.

La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(b) (1998).
La. R.S. 23:1031 (1998).
Lisonbee v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Co., 278 So. 2d 5, 7 (La. 1973).
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and its economic impacts on employers. New legal theories for
imposing legal liability upon the employer, such as the negligence
theories, are likely to continue to emerge. While courts should
explore the new and emerging theories from both a legal and social
policy standpoint to see their effect on other theories of recovery,
employers must also take proactive measures, such as creating
employment plans, investing in employment practices liability
insurance, and arguing for a contraction of vicarious liability in the
context of workplace violence, to address the issue of workplace
violence sensibly and to minimize their own risk of liability,
hopefully averting workplace violence incidents altogether.
Whitney L. Elzen
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thanks him for all of his words of encouragement throughout the year.

